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Abstract
We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property)
over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly
the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the
other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We char-
acterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee
minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.
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1 Introduction
Restitution is a form of delivering justice to people that have been dispossessed of their land or
property. We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (object)
over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly
the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other.
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The government faces a budget constraint and the compensation cannot exceed the market value of
the object. A rule determines, for each problem, who gets the object and the level of compensation
for the other agent. Note that an agent cannot receive the object and a compensation at the same
time. Moreover, a negative compensation is not allowed. We are interested in fair rules that are
immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the
budget constraint.
Our study is inspired by the discussion of reparation for victims of the internal conflict and
land restitution in Colombia. The conflict between the government, the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), and paramilitaries displaced many people from their lands in the last
decades. It is estimated that there are between 3.6 and 5.2 million displaced people in Colombia.
In June 2011, the Colombian government introduced a bill on land restitution stipulating that the
dispossessed agent gets the land and the owner receives exactly the market value of the land as a
compensation. However, only approximately 10% of the displaced people are willing to return to
their original residency (Iba´n˜ez, 2009).
Colombia is not the only country with restitution problems. After the reunification of Germany
in 1990, there were 1.2 million (separate) claims for the restitution of land or property expropri-
ated by either the Third Reich or the government of former East Germany (Blacksell and Born,
2002). When a claim for restitution was endorsed, the applicant had to decide whether he wanted
restitution or compensation (Southern, 1993). Many countries in Central and Eastern Europe also
adopted policies for the restitution of land or property that had been confiscated during the Com-
munist era. In Bulgaria, Estonia, and Latvia, the restitution consisted of the delivery of the actual
property. Hungary instituted vouchers, which were issued in lieu of cash payments, that could
be used to buy shares in privatized companies, to pay for state-owned housing or to buy land at
state land auctions. In Lithuania, the restitution law specified the right to receive land or com-
pensation (Grover and Bo´rquez, 2004). Another example is South Africa, where after the abolition
of apartheid, there was a land restitution program in which land was returned or claimants were
compensated financially (Barry, 2011). The confiscated land during the Cuban revolution and the
divided island of Cyprus will most likely lead to similar restitution problems in the future.
Our objective is to identify rules that are well-behaved from normative and strategic viewpoints.
We assess the desirability of a rule from different perspectives: fairness, incentives, and whether it
satisfies the budget constraint.
According to the United Nations, reparative measures should be fair, just, proportionate to the
gravity of the violation and the resulting damage, and should include restitution and compensation
amongst others (van Boven, 2010). In the literature of fair allocation, a basic requirement is
envy-freeness, i.e., no agent should prefer the other agent’s consumption to his own (Foley, 1967).
In a restitution problem, the dispossessed agent is perceived as the victim and should receive a
more favorable treatment. Therefore, we propose an asymmetric version of envy-freeness that only
applies to the dispossessed agent, dispossessed envy-freeness, i.e., the dispossessed agent should not
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prefer the owner’s consumption to his own.
Strategic considerations lead to the next axiom. We may not know agent’s valuation of the
object. If we ask the agent for his valuation, he may behave strategically. Hence, we require
strategy-proofness, i.e., no agent benefits from misrepresenting his valuation. We focus also on
possible joint manipulations by the dispossessed agent and the owner, and study pair strategy-
proofness, i.e., no joint misrepresentation of valuations should make both agents at least as well off,
and at least one of them better off. We also consider a weaker version of pair strategy-proofness
called weak pair strategy-proofness, i.e., no joint misrepresentation of valuations should make both
agents better off.
Since the monetary compensation is provided by the government, there is a budget constraint.
The government can give at most the market value of the object to the agent who does not receive
the object. Finally, we also would like to guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents. We define
two properties because of the asymmetry of agents in the restitution problem. The first property
is dispossessed welfare lower bound, i.e., the allotment of the dispossessed agent should be at least
as desirable as the object. The second one is owner welfare lower bound, i.e., the allotment of the
owner should be at least as desirable as the object or at least as desirable as the market value of
the object.
Our main result is a characterization of the family of rules that satisfy dispossessed envy-
freeness, strategy-proofness and two continuity properties (Theorem 1). The rules in the family
are parametrized by a “threshold function” τ and a “monetary compensation function” m. We
call these rules the τ -m family. The threshold function τ is a function of the valuation of the
owner. The dispossessed agent receives the object if and only if his valuation weakly surpasses the
threshold. In addition, the threshold function determines the compensation for the dispossessed
agent when he does not get the object. The compensation function m is a function of the valuation
of the dispossessed agent, and determines the compensation for the owner when he does not get
the object.
Next, we consider the budget constraint and identify the subfamily of the τ -m family that also
satisfies government budget constraint (Theorem 2). Moreover, we incorporate welfare lower bounds
and identify the subfamily of the τ -m family that also satisfies owner welfare lower bound (Theorem
3)— all our rules in the τ -m family satisfy dispossessed welfare lower bound (Proposition 5). Finally,
we characterize the subfamily of the τ -m family that satisfies both properties, government budget
constraint and owner welfare lower bound (Theorem 4).
The Colombian government’s rule does not satisfy dispossessed envy-freeness. In the family of
the rules that we characterize, there are “simple” rules that are easy to put in practice and satisfy
dispossessed envy-freeness and government budget constraint. As an example, consider the rule
that gives the land to the dispossessed agent if and only if his valuation is at least the market value
of the land. The agent who does not get the land receives the market value as a compensation.
This rule belongs to all the families we characterize in Theorems 1, 2, 3, and 4.
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The closest model to ours is the allocation of indivisible goods together with some amount of
an infinitely divisible good among agents. However, in that environment, each agent is allowed to
consume a good and a monetary compensation at the same time. There, envy-freeness and strategy-
proofness are not compatible (Alkan, Demange, and Gale, 1991, Tadenuma and Thomson, 1995).
However, there are some variants of this model where this incompatibility does not hold: the domain
where the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bounds for each
good (Sun and Yang, 2003, Andersson and Svensson, 2008) and the domain where the monetary
compensations have to exceed some exogenously given lower bounds for each good (Andersson,
Svensson, and Yang, 2010). Also, in economies with quasi-linear preferences, to achieve immunity
to strategic behavior, often Vickrey-Clarke-Groves rules are used (Vickrey, 1961, Clarke, 1971, and
Groves, 1973). Since in our environment a negative compensation is not allowed, we cannot appeal
to Vickrey-Clarke-Groves rules.
There are also two papers about land acquisition with many sellers and one buyer focusing on
Bayesian incentive compatibility (Mishra, Sarkar and Sen, 2008 and Kominers and Weyl, 2011).
Kominers and Weyl (2011) propose “concordance mechanisms” that are “approximately individ-
ually rational”, ensure incentive compatibility, and converge to efficiency as the number of sellers
tends to infinite. Mishra et al. (2008) characterize incentive compatible mechanisms that satisfy
exactly two of the properties among individual rationality, budget balancedness, and efficiency.
In Section 2, we introduce the model and some properties of rules. In Section 3, we present our
results and the independence of axioms. Finally, in Section 4 we conclude. All proofs are relegated
to Section 5.
2 Model and Properties of Rules
There is an indivisible good, an object γ, and there are two agents: the dispossessed agent d and
the owner o. Each agent may consume either the object or a non-negative monetary compensation
but not both. The consumption space for each agent is {γ} ∪R+. Each agent has preferences over
the consumption space which have a utility representation ud for the dispossessed agent and uo
for the owner. We assume that for each agent, there exists a finite compensation such that he is
indifferent between receiving this amount of compensation and getting the object. Let Vd and Vo
be these compensations which we call the valuation of the object for the dispossessed agent and
the valuation of the owner, respectively. Then, we have ud(γ) = Vd and uo(γ) = Vo, and for any
compensation m ∈ R+, we have ud(m) = uo(m) = m. The compensation is given by a third party,
the government. Let Vg > 0 be the market value of the object.
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Although (Vd, Vo, Vg) is the primitive of the problem, since Vg does not change throughout the
paper, we define a restitution problem as a pair (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+. An allocation z ∈ ({γ} ∪ R+)2
1In many instances, the market value of the object may not be known. In these cases, the market value represents
the maximum amount of money that the government is willing to give as a compensation.
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is an assignment of the object γ and a compensation m ≥ 0 such that z = (zd, zo) = (γ,m) or
z = (zd, zo) = (m, γ). Let Z be the set of allocations. A rule is a function ϕ : R2+ → Z that assigns
to each problem an allocation. Note that an agent cannot receive the object and a compensation at
the same time. Moreover, a negative compensation is not allowed.
Next, we list desirable properties of rules. Let ϕ be a rule. We are interested in rules that are
fair. One of the basic fairness requirements is envy-freeness, i.e., no agent should prefer the other
agent’s consumption to his own.
Envy-freeness: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, we have ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)) ≥ ud(ϕo(Vd, Vo)) and
uo(ϕo(Vd, Vo)) ≥ uo(ϕd(Vd, Vo)).
Since in a restitution problem the dispossessed agent is perceived as the victim and the “weakest”
agent, and should receive a more favorable treatment, we propose an asymmetric version of envy-
freeness that applies only to the dispossessed agent, dispossessed envy-freeness, i.e., the dispossessed
agent should not prefer the owner’s consumption to his own.
Dispossessed envy-freeness: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, we have ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)) ≥ ud(ϕo(Vd, Vo)).
Strategic considerations lead to the next axiom. We may not know agents’ true valuations of
the object. As agents may behave strategically, we require strategy-proofness, i.e., no agent should
benefit from misrepresenting his valuation.
Strategy-proofness: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, each V ′d ∈ R+, each V ′o ∈ R+, we have
ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)) ≥ ud(ϕd(V ′d, Vo)) and uo(ϕo(Vd, Vo)) ≥ uo(ϕo(Vd, V ′o)).
We also focus on possible joint manipulations by both agents. We study pair strategy-proofness,
i.e., no joint misrepresentation of valuations should make an agent better off without making the
other worse off.
Pair strategy-proofness: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, there is no (V ′d, V ′o) ∈ R2+ such that for each
i ∈ {d, o}, ui(ϕi(V ′d, V ′o)) ≥ ui(ϕi(Vd, Vo)) and for some i ∈ {d, o}, ui(ϕi(V ′d, V ′o)) > ui(ϕi(Vd, Vo)).
We consider a weaker version of the above property and study weak pair strategy-proofness, i.e.,
no joint misrepresentation of valuations should make both agents better off.
Weak pair strategy-proofness: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, there is no (V ′d, V ′o) ∈ R2+ such that for
each i ∈ {d, o}, ui(ϕi(V ′d, V ′o)) > ui(ϕi(Vd, Vo)).
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Note that pair strategy-proofness implies weak pair strategy-proofness but not strategy-proofness.2
Since the compensation is provided by the government, there is a budget constraint. The
government can give at most the market value of the object, Vg, to the agent who does not receive
the object.
Government budget constraint: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ and each i ∈ {d, o}, if ϕi(Vd, Vo) 6= γ,
then ϕi(Vd, Vo) ≤ Vg.
We consider rules that guarantee welfare lower bounds for the agents. The asymmetry of the
problem leads us to define two conditions. We consider dispossessed welfare lower bound, i.e.,
the dispossessed agent should be given something at least as desirable as the object. Since the
owner possesses the object, to guarantee his participation it is enough to compensate him with the
minimum of his valuation and the market value of the object. Hence, we consider owner welfare
lower bound, i.e., the owner should either get the object or should receive at least as much as the
minimum of his valuation and the market value of the object.
Dispossessed welfare lower bound: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, we have ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)) ≥ Vd.
Owner welfare lower bound: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, we have uo(ϕo(Vd, Vo)) ≥ min{Vo, Vg}.
We are interested in rules for which small changes in the data of the problem do not cause large
changes in the chosen allocation in terms of the welfare of the dispossessed agent or the allocation
of the object.
Continuity: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ and each {V no }∞n=1 such that V no n→∞−−−→ Vo, we have
ud(ϕd(Vd, V
n
o ))
n→∞−−−→ ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)).
Object continuity: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ and each {V nd }∞n=1 such that V nd
n→∞−−−→ Vd, if for each
n = 1, 2, ..., ϕd(V
n
d , Vo) = γ, then ϕd(Vd, Vo) = γ.
3 Results
3.1 Fairness and Incentive Compatibility
First, we show that there are envy-free and strategy-proof rules. In fact, there is essentially a unique
rule. Let (Vd, Vo) be a problem. If Vd > Vo, we show that by envy-freeness and strategy-proofness,
2Another property related to group manipulations in the literature is called group strategy-proofness, i.e., no subset
of agents should ever be able to make each of its members at least as well off, and at least one of them better off
by jointly misrepresenting their valuations. Note that pair strategy-proofness differs from group strategy-proofness,
since we only consider manipulations by the dispossessed agent and the owner simultaneously. Hence, unlike group
strategy-proofness, there is no logical relationship between pair strategy-proofness and strategy-proofness.
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the allocation should be (γ, Vd). Similarly, if Vd < Vo, we show that by envy-freeness and strategy-
proofness, the allocation should be (Vo, γ). If Vd = Vo, the allocation can be either (γ, Vd) or (Vo, γ).
A tie-breaking function θ is a function that maps each v ∈ R+ to either (γ, v) or (v, γ). We define
a family of rules in which each rule is associated with a tie-breaking function and vice versa each
tie-breaking function induces a rule. Formally, for a tie-breaking function θ,
ϕθ(Vd, Vo) =

(γ, Vd) if Vd > Vo;
(Vo, γ) if Vd < Vo;
θ(v) if Vd = Vo = v.
Proposition 1. A rule ϕ satisfies envy-freeness and strategy-proofness if and only if there is a
tie-breaking function θ such that ϕ = ϕθ.3
In a restitution problem, the dispossessed agent is perceived as the victim and should receive
a more favorable treatment. Hence, we are interested in dispossessed envy-free and strategy-proof
rules, i.e., a wider class of rules than those of Proposition 1. Before we present our main results,
it is convenient to introduce the so-called τ -m family. Each rule in this family is parametrized by
a “threshold function” τ and a “(monetary) compensation function” m. The threshold
function τ is a function of Vo. The dispossessed agent d receives the object if and only if Vd weakly
exceeds the threshold. In addition, the threshold function specifies the compensation for d when
he does not get the object. The compensation function m is a function of Vd, and specifies the
compensation for the owner o when he does not get the object. Note that how much o receives as
a compensation only depends on Vd. Formally, the threshold function τ : R+ → R+ is a function
that
• is non-decreasing ; for each V ′o , Vo ∈ R+ with V ′o > Vo, τ(V ′o) ≥ τ(Vo);
• is continuous; for each {V no }∞n=1 such that V no n→∞−−−→ V , τ(V no ) n→∞−−−→ τ(V ); and
• satisfies constant threshold ; if τ(Vo) < Vo, then for each V ′o > Vo, τ(V ′o) = τ(Vo).
Let T be set of all threshold functions that are non-decreasing, continuous and satisfy constant
threshold. Before defining the compensation function, we introduce some notation. For each Vd, let
τ−1(Vd) be the inverse image of τ at Vd, i.e., τ−1(Vd) = {vo ∈ R+ : τ(vo) = Vd}. Note that possibly
τ−1(Vd) = ∅. The valuation Vd can be of three different types according to the characteristics of
the associated τ−1(Vd).
Vd is of type

1© if τ−1(Vd) 6= ∅ and sup{τ−1(Vd)} <∞;
2© if τ−1(Vd) 6= ∅ and sup{τ−1(Vd)} =∞;
3© if τ−1(Vd) = ∅.
3For the tightness of the characterization, we refer to the Appendix.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
τ
45o
vo
vd
45o
vo
vd
45o
vo
vd
45o
vo
vd
τ(vo) = vo
τ(vo) = k
Vd
τ−1(Vd)
Vd
τ−1(Vd) = ∅
Vd
τ−1(Vd) = R+
Vd
τ−1(Vd)
τ
Figure 1: Examples of τ functions: τ functions are non-decreasing, continuous, and satisfy constant
threshold. In (a), τ induces the envy-free and strategy-proof rule ϕθ(Proposition 1) where the tie-breaking
function is θ(v) = (γ, v) for each v ∈ R+. Moreover, Vd is of type 1©. In (b), τ does not start at the origin
and Vd is of type 3©. In (c), Vd is of type 2©. Finally, constant threshold implies that the function is constant
after it intersects with the 45◦ line, but not in case of only “touching” the 45◦ line as in (d). Moreover, in
(d), Vd is of type 1©.
Note that if Vd is of type 2©, Vd = maxvo∈R+ τ(vo). See Figure 1 for examples of τ and τ−1(Vd).
A compensation function is used to determine a monetary compensation for the owner and
hence is defined over
Vd(τ) = {Vd ∈ R+ : there exists Vo ∈ R+ such that Vd ≥ τ(Vo)}.
Formally, a compensation function is a function m : Vd(τ) → R+ such that for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ),
m(Vd) ∈ [l(Vd), u(Vd)] where4
• l(Vd) =
{
max{τ−1(Vd)} if Vd is of type 1©;
0 if Vd is of type 2© or 3©.
and
4Since τ is continuous, the maximum of τ−1(Vd) is well-defined.
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• u(Vd) =
{
l(Vd) if if Vd is of type 1©;
Vd if Vd is of type 2© or 3©.
Note that for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), l(Vd) ≤ u(Vd). Also, if Vd is of type 1©, then by constant threshold,
max{τ−1(Vd)} ≤ Vd. Therefore, for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) ≤ Vd. Let M(τ ) be the set of all
compensation functions for a given threshold function τ .
Let τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ). We define the rule ϕτ,m as follows. For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+,
ϕτ,m(Vd, Vo) =
{
(γ,m(Vd)) if Vd ≥ τ(Vo); (1a)
(τ(Vo), γ) if Vd < τ(Vo). (1b)
We call the family of rules induced by pairs (τ,m) with τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ) the τ -m family.
See Figure 2 for an example of a rule in this family.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
m = max{τ−1(Vd)}
45o
vo
vd
45o
vo
vd
45o
vo
vd
Vom ∈
45o
vo
vd
Vo
Vd
τ(Vo)
m ∈
Vd
Vd
Vo
τ(Vo)
Vd
Vo
τ(Vo)=
τ(Vo)=
Vd Vd0 0
τ τ
ττ
m = max{τ−1(Vd)}
Figure 2: Example of rules in the τ -m family. In (a), Vd is of type 1© and the compensation is
equal to the inverse image of Vd under τ . In (b), Vd is also of type 1© and the compensation is equal to the
maximum of the inverse image of Vd under τ . In (c), Vd is of type 2©. In (d), Vd is of type 3©. In both (c)
and (d), the compensation is chosen from the interval between 0 and Vd.
Next, we present our first main result which is a characterization of the τ -m family.
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Theorem 1. A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, and
object continuity if and only if there exist τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ) such that ϕ = ϕτ,m.
Some rules in the τ -m family are pair strategy-proof.
Proposition 2. Let τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ). Then, ϕτ,m is pair strategy-proof if and only if for
each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) = 0 and there exists a constant c ∈ R+ such that for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ) = R+,
m(Vd) = c.
Moreover, each rule in the τ -m family is weakly pair strategy-proof.
Proposition 3. Let τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ). Then, ϕτ,m is weakly pair strategy-proof.
3.2 Government Budget Constraint
Now, we consider the budget constraint faced by the government, assuming that it can or is willing to
spend at most the market value of the object as a compensation. The first result is an impossibility
result.
Proposition 4. No rule satisfies envy-freeness, strategy-proofness and government budget con-
straint.
Next, we relax envy-freeness to dispossessed envy-freeness to obtain a subfamily of the τ -
m family that satisfies government budget constraint. In this subfamily, each threshold function
is bounded above by Vg. Moreover, the upper bound u(Vd) of each compensation function is
min{Vd, Vg} if Vd is of type 2© or 3©.
Theorem 2. A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object
continuity, and government budget constraint if and only if ϕ = ϕτ,m where τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ)
are such that
• for each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) ≤ Vg and
• for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) ∈ [l(Vd), u(Vd)] with u(Vd) = min{Vd, Vg} if Vd is of type 2© or 3©.
Note that for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), l(Vd) ≤ u(Vd). See Figure 3 for examples of rules in this
subfamily.
3.3 Welfare Lower Bounds
Next, we consider properties that guarantee minimum welfare levels for the agents. Each rule in
the τ -m family satisfies dispossessed welfare lower bound.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Vg
45o
vo
vd
45o
vo
vd
45o
vo
vd
45o
voVo
τ(Vo)
m ∈
Vd
Vo
τ(Vo)
m ∈
Vd
vd
Vd0 0
τ τ
τ
τ
Vg Vg
Vg Vg
Figure 3: Examples of rules in the τ -m family satisfying government budget constraint.
Note that all τ functions are bounded above by Vg. In both (c) and (d), Vd is of type 3© and the compensation
is chosen from the interval between 0 and min{Vd, Vg}.
Proposition 5. Let τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ). Then, ϕτ,m satisfies dispossessed welfare lower bound.
The next result is the characterization of the subfamily of the τ -m family that satisfies also owner
welfare lower bound. In this subfamily, each threshold function is bounded below by min{Vo, Vg}
and it cannot cross the 45◦ line before the value of Vg. Moreover, the lower bound l(Vd) of each
compensation function is min{Vd, Vg} if Vd is of type 2© or 3©.
Theorem 3. A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object
continuity, and owner welfare lower bound if and only if ϕ = ϕτ,m where τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ)
are such that
• for each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) ≥ min{Vo, Vg} and
• for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) ∈ [l(Vd), u(Vd)] with l(Vd) = min{Vd, Vg} if Vd is of type 2© or 3©.
Note that for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), l(Vd) ≤ u(Vd). See Figure 4 for examples of rules in this
subfamily.
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(a) (b)
(d)(c)
Vg
45o
vo
vd
45o
vo
vd
45o
vo
vd
VoVdm ∈
45o
vo
vd
τ(Vo)
τ τ
τ
τ
Vg Vg
Vg
Vd
Vg
Figure 4: Examples of rules in the τ -m family satisfying owner welfare lower bound.
Note that since for each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) ≥ min{Vo, Vg}, τ cannot cross the 45◦ line before the value of Vg.
In (d), Vd is of type 3© and the compensation is between min{Vd, Vg} and Vd.
Our last result is the characterization of the subfamily of the τ -m family that satisfies both
government budget constraint and owner welfare lower bound. In this subfamily, each threshold
function is bounded above by Vg and bounded below by min{Vo, Vg} and it cannot cross the 45◦
line before the value of Vg. Moreover, both the upper bound u(Vd) and the lower bound l(Vd) of
each compensation function are equal to Vg if Vd is of type 2© or 3©.
Theorem 4. A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object
continuity, government budget constraint, and owner welfare lower bound if and only if ϕ = ϕτ,m
where τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ) are such that
• for each Vo ∈ R+, min{Vo, Vg} ≤ τ(Vo) ≤ Vg and
• for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) ∈ [l(Vd), u(Vd)] with l(Vd) = u(Vd) = Vg if Vd is of type 2© or 3©.
Note that for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), l(Vd) ≤ u(Vd). See Figure 5 for examples of rules in this
subfamily. In Table 1, we summarize our results and compare the threshold functions and the
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
m = Vg
45o
vo
vd
45o
vo
vd
45o
vo
vd
45o
voVo
Vd
vd
τ τ
τ
τ
Vg Vg
Vg
Vg
Figure 5: Examples of rules in the τ -m family satisfying government budget constraint
and owner welfare lower bound. Note that the τ functions are bounded above by Vg, and since for
each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) ≥ min{Vo, Vg}, τ cannot cross the 45◦ line before the value of Vg. In (d), Vd is of
type 3© and the compensation is equal to Vg.
lower and upper bounds for the compensation functions in each family in Theorems 1, 2, 3, and 4.
3.4 Tightness of Characterizations
In this section, we discuss the tightness of our characterizations in Theorems 1, 2, 3, and 4.5 See
Table 2 for a summary of the independence of the properties.
1. The rule ϕG is defined as ϕG(Vd, Vo) = (γ, Vg) for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+. It satisfies strategy-
proofness, continuity, object continuity, owner welfare lower bound, government budget con-
straint, dispossessed welfare lower bound, and weak pair strategy-proofness but not dispossessed
envy-freeness.
5See the appendix for the proofs of the independence of axioms.
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τ m
m(Vd) ∈ [l(Vd), u(Vd)]
Vd is 1© Vd is 2© or 3©
l(Vd) = u(Vd) l(Vd) u(Vd)
Theorem 1 [·Dispossessed envy-freeness τ ∈ T :
max{τ−1(Vd)} 0 Vd
·Strategy-proofness non-decreasing
·Continuity continuous
·Object continuity ] constant threshold
Theorem 2 [· · · ·] τ ∈ T and
max{τ−1(Vd)} 0 min{Vd, Vg}
+ Government budget constraint τ(Vo) ≤ Vg
Theorem 3 [· · · ·] τ ∈ T and
max{τ−1(Vd)} min{Vd, Vg} Vd
+ Owner welfare lower bound min{Vg, Vo} ≤ τ(Vo)
Theorem 4 [· · · ·] τ ∈ T and
max{τ−1(Vd)} Vg Vg+ Government budget constraint min{Vg, Vo} ≤ τ(Vo) ≤ Vg
+ Owner welfare lower bound
Table 1: τ -m family and its subfamilies: We compare of the threshold functions and the lower and
upper bounds for the compensation functions if Vd is of type 1©, 2© or 3© in each family in Theorems 1, 2,
3, and 4.
2. The rule ϕmin,Vg is defined as
ϕmin,Vg(Vd, Vo) =
{
(γ,min{Vo, Vg}) if Vd ≥ Vg;
(Vg, γ) if Vd < Vg,
for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+. It satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, continuity, object continuity,
owner welfare lower bound, government budget constraint, dispossessed welfare lower bound,
and weak pair strategy-proofness but not strategy-proofness.
3. The rule ϕ◦ is defined as
ϕ◦(Vd, Vo) =

(γ, Vg) if Vd ≥ τ(Vo) and Vd ≥ Vg;
(γ,
Vg
2 ) if Vd ≥ τ(Vo) and Vd < Vg;
(Vg, γ) if Vd < τ(Vo) and Vo >
Vg
2 ;
(
Vg
2 , γ) if Vd < τ(Vo) and Vo ≤ Vg2 ,
where τ(Vo) =
{
Vg
2 if Vo ≤ Vg2 ;
Vg if Vo >
Vg
2 .
for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+. It satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, object con-
tinuity, owner welfare lower bound, government budget constraint, dispossessed welfare lower
bound, and weak pair strategy-proofness but not continuity.
4. Let τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ). The rule ϕ> is defined as
ϕ>(Vd, Vo) =
{
(γ,m(Vd)) if Vd > τ(Vo);
(τ(Vo), γ) if Vd ≤ τ(Vo),
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Properties / Rules ϕG ϕmin,Vg ϕ◦ ϕ> ϕk>Vg ϕτ=m=0
Dispossessed envy-freeness − + + + + +
Strategy-proofness + − + + + +
Continuity + + − + + +
Object continuity + + + − + +
Government budget constraint + + + + − +
Owner welfare lower bound + + + + + −
Dispossessed welfare lower bound + + + + + +
Weak pair strategy-proofness + + + + + +
Table 2: Tightness of the characterizations: The first six properties show independence of axioms
for the characterizations in Theorems 1, 2, 3, and 4. We indicate that the rule corresponding to the column
satisfies (does not satisfy) the property corresponding to the row by + (−).
for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+. It satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity,
owner welfare lower bound, government budget constraint, dispossessed welfare lower bound,
and weak pair strategy-proofness but not object continuity.
5. Let k > Vg. The rule ϕ
k>Vg is defined as ϕk>Vg = ϕτ,m where for each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) = k
and each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) = Vd. It satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness,
continuity, object continuity, owner welfare lower bound, dispossessed welfare lower bound,
and weak pair strategy-proofness but not government budget constraint.
6. The rule ϕτ=m=0 is defined as ϕτ=m=0 = ϕτ,m where for each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) = 0 and each
Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) = 0. It satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity,
object continuity, government budget constraint, dispossessed welfare lower bound, and weak
pair strategy-proofness but not owner welfare lower bound.
4 Concluding Remarks
We consider the allocation of an indivisible good when compensation, subject to a budget constraint,
is only possible for the agent who does not get the good. Our main result is the characterization of
rules that satisfy dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness and two continuity properties. We
identify the subfamily of rules that also satisfy government budget constraint and another subfamily
of rules that also satisfy owner welfare lower bound. Finally, we characterize the subfamily of rules
that satisfy both properties, government budget constraint and owner welfare lower bound.
In the context of land restitution in Colombia, which inspired our study, the government’s rule
does not satisfy dispossessed envy-freeness. However, in the family of the rules that we characterize,
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there are “simple” rules that are easy to put in practice and satisfy dispossessed envy-freeness
and government budget constraint. As an example, consider the rule that gives the land to the
dispossessed agent if and only if his valuation is at least the market value of the land. The agent
who does not get the land receives the market value as a compensation. This rule belongs to all
the families we characterize in Theorems 1, 2, 3, and 4.
In this paper, we do not discuss efficiency, i.e., if an allocation is selected, there should be no
other feasible allocation that each agent finds at least as desirable and at least one agent prefers. In
restitution problems, it is possible to make an agent better off without hurting the other agent by
increasing the compensation. Therefore, there is no efficient allocation. By taking into account the
budget constraint of the government, we can define constrained efficiency. This property stipulates
that whenever an agent does not get the object, he should receive Vg. There is a unique rule in the
τ -m family that satisfies constrained efficiency where τ and m are constant functions with value Vg.
Additional fairness properties can be considered in our model. In the fairness literature, a
weaker property than envy-freeness, equal treatment of equals, has been studied. This property
states that when two agents are “equal,” they should receive the same allotment. In our model,
equal treatment of equals is impossible because of the restriction on consumption (an agent can only
receive either the object or money). As an alternative, we can consider a property that requires
that when the dispossessed and the owner have the same valuation of the object and this valuation
is smaller than the government constraint, both agents should receive the same in welfare terms.
We call this property constrained equal treatment of equals in welfare. There is a unique rule in the
subfamily characterized in Theorem 4 that satisfies constrained equal treatment of equals in welfare,
where τ is the 45◦- line up to Vg and constant afterwards.
Finally, we could ask how the government should select the τ function. The government may
not know the exact valuations of the dispossessed agent and the owner. Then, the uncertainty of the
government could be modeled as a probability distribution over the valuations. Hence, it might want
to minimize expected compensation or choose a τ function that gives the object to the dispossessed
agent more often in expectation. If the set of possible valuations is uniformly distributed, the τ
function that coincides with the 45◦- line up to Vg gives the object to the dispossessed agent more
often in expectation. If we have a degenerate mass at the valuation of the owner, then again the τ
function that coincides with the 45◦- line up to Vg minimizes the expected government expenditure.
Possible future research could tackle a generalization of this model where an owner has more
than one piece of land or the dispossessed agent has preferences over multiple pieces of land and
may receive a piece of land that he did not possess before.
5 Appendix
Proposition 1. A rule ϕ satisfies envy-freeness and strategy-proofness if and only if there is a
tie-breaking function θ such that ϕ = ϕθ.
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Proof. It is easy to check that ϕθ satisfies envy-freeness and strategy-proofness. We prove that if
ϕ is envy-free and strategy-proof, then there is a tie-breaking function θ such that ϕ = ϕθ. Let
(Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+.
Step 1: If an agent has a strictly higher valuation than the other agent, then the former gets the
object.
Without loss of generality, assume that Vd > Vo. Suppose that the owner gets the object.
Then, ϕo(Vd, Vo) = γ. By envy-freeness, m ≡ ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)) ≥ ud(ϕo(Vd, Vo)) = Vd. Then,
uo(ϕo(Vd, Vo)) = Vo < Vd ≤ m = uo(ϕd(Vd, Vo)) which is a contradiction to envy-freeness.
Step 2: The agent who does not get the object receives a compensation equal to the other agent’s
valuation.
Without loss of generality, assume that ϕd(Vd, Vo) 6= γ. By Step 1, we know that Vo ≥ Vd. We
need to show that ϕd(Vd, Vo) = Vo. By envy-freeness, Vd ≤ ϕd(Vd, Vo) ≤ Vo. Suppose ϕd(Vd, Vo) <
Vo. Let V
′
d be such that ϕd(Vd, Vo) < V
′
d < Vo. Then, by envy-freeness and Step 1 (the owner
gets the object at (V ′d, Vo)), we have Vd < V
′
d ≤ ϕd(V ′d, Vo) ≤ Vo. Then, ud(ϕd(V ′d, Vo)) ≥ V ′d >
ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)). Then, V
′
d is a profitable manipulation for the dispossessed agent at (Vd, Vo) in
violation of strategy-proofness. Hence, ϕd(Vd, Vo) = Vo.
Finally, if Vd = Vo = v, then by Step 2, ϕ(Vd, Vo) = (γ, Vd) or ϕ(Vd, Vo) = (Vo, γ). Let θ be the
function such that for each v ∈ R+, θ(v) = ϕ(v, v). Then, ϕ = ϕθ.
Tightness of the characterization in Proposition 1:
1. The rule ϕG is defined as ϕG(Vd, Vo) = (γ, Vg) for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+. It satisfies strategy-
proofness but not envy-freeness.
Proof. Since the allocation is independent of the reported valuations of the agents, ϕG is strategy-
proof.
Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ be such that Vd < Vg. Then, ud(ϕGd (Vd, Vo)) = Vd < Vg = ud(ϕGo (Vd, Vo))
which is a contradiction to envy-freeness.
2. The rule ϕ≥ is defined as
ϕ≥(Vd, Vo) =
{
(γ, Vo) if Vd ≥ Vo;
(Vd, γ) if Vd < Vo,
for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+. It satisfies envy-freeness but not strategy-proofness.
Proof. It is to easy to see that ϕ≥ is envy-free. If Vd ≥ Vo, the dispossessed agent gets the object
and the owner receives Vo ≤ Vd. If Vd < Vo, the owner gets the object and the dispossessed agent
receives Vd < Vo.
To see that ϕ≥ is not strategy-proof, let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ be such that Vd > Vo. Then, ϕ≥(Vd, Vo) =
(γ, Vo). Let V
′
o such that Vd ≥ V ′o > Vo. Then, ϕ≥(Vd, V ′o) = (γ, V ′o). Hence, uo(ϕ≥o (Vd, V ′o)) = V ′o >
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Vo = uo(ϕ
≥
o (Vd, Vo)). Then, V
′
o is a profitable manipulation for the owner at (Vd, Vo). Hence, ϕ
≥ is
not strategy-proof.
Theorem 1. A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, and
object continuity if and only if there exist τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ) such that ϕ = ϕτ,m.
Proof.
(⇒) Let ϕ be dispossessed envy-free, strategy-proof, continuous, and object continuous. We need
to show that there exist a threshold function τ ∈ T and a compensation function m ∈ M(τ) such
that ϕ = ϕτ,m.
Let D1 = {(vd, vo) ∈ R2+ : ϕd(vd, vo) = γ} and D2 = {(vd, vo) ∈ R2+ : ϕo(vd, vo) = γ}. Let
f : D1 → R+ be defined as f(Vd, Vo) = ϕo(Vd, Vo) for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ D1. Let g : D2 → R+ be
defined as g(Vd, Vo) = ϕd(Vd, Vo) for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ D2. Since ϕ is dispossessed envy-free, for each
Vd ∈ R+ and Vo, V ′o ∈ R+ with (Vd, Vo) ∈ D1 and (Vd, V ′o) ∈ D2, we have
f(Vd, Vo) ≤ Vd ≤ g(Vd, V ′o). (2)
Lemma 1. Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ be such that ϕd(Vd, Vo) = γ. Let V ′d > Vd. Then, ϕd(V ′d, Vo) = γ.
Proof. Suppose ϕd(V
′
d, Vo) 6= γ. Then, by dispossessed envy-freeness, ud(ϕd(V ′d, Vo)) = ϕd(V ′d, Vo) ≥
V ′d > Vd = ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)). Then, V
′
d is a profitable manipulation for the dispossessed agent at
(Vd, Vo) in violation of strategy-proofness. Hence, ϕd(V
′
d, Vo) = γ.
In view of Lemma 1 and given the valuation of the owner Vo, we define the infimum of the valua-
tions of the dispossessed agent that give him the object. Formally, τ(Vo) ≡ inf{Vd : ϕd(Vd, Vo) = γ}.
Then, by the definition of τ(Vo) and Lemma 1, we know that if Vd > τ(Vo), then ϕd(Vd, Vo) = γ
and if Vd < τ(Vo), then ϕo(Vd, Vo) = γ. Now, let Vd = τ(Vo). Consider a sequence {V nd }∞n=1 =
Vd +
1
n > Vd. Since ϕ is object continuous, ϕd(Vd, Vo) = γ. Therefore,
ϕd(Vd, Vo) = γ if Vd ≥ τ(Vo);
ϕo(Vd, Vo) = γ if Vd < τ(Vo).
(3)
Lemma 2. Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+. If Vd < τ(Vo), then g(Vd, Vo) = τ(Vo).
Proof. Let Vo ∈ R+. Assume τ(Vo) > 0. (Otherwise, the statement holds trivially.)
Step 1: There exists t such that for each Vd < τ(Vo), g(Vd, Vo) = t.
Suppose it is not the case. Then, there are Vd < τ(Vo) and V
′
d < τ(Vo) such that ϕd(V
′
d, Vo) =
g(V ′d, Vo) 6= g(Vd, Vo) = ϕd(Vd, Vo). Without loss of generality, assume that ϕd(V ′d, Vo) > ϕd(Vd, Vo).
Then, V ′d is a profitable manipulation for the dispossessed agent at (Vd, Vo) in violation of strategy-
proofness. Hence, there exists t such that for each Vd < τ(Vo), g(Vd, Vo) = t.
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Step 2: t ≥ τ(Vo).
Suppose t < τ(Vo). Let Vd be such that t < Vd < τ(Vo) and V
′
d ≡ τ(Vo). Then, if Vd is the
dispossessed agent’s valuation, he can report V ′d instead and obtain ud(ϕd(V
′
d, Vo)) = Vd > t =
ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)). Then, V
′
d is a profitable manipulation for the dispossessed agent at (Vd, Vo) in
violation of strategy-proofness.
Step 3: t ≤ τ(Vo).
Suppose t > τ(Vo). Let Vd, V
′
d be such that t > V
′
d > τ(Vo) > Vd. Then, if V
′
d is the dispossessed
agent’s valuation, he can report Vd instead and obtain ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)) = t > V
′
d = ud(ϕd(V
′
d, Vo)).
Then, Vd is a profitable manipulation for the dispossessed agent at (V
′
d, Vo) in violation of strategy-
proofness.
Therefore, for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ with Vd < τ(Vo), we have g(Vd, Vo) = τ(Vo).
Therefore, Equation (1b) holds. Next, we show that τ ∈ T .
I τ is non-decreasing.
Suppose τ is not non-decreasing. Then, there exist Vo, V
′
o ∈ R+ such that Vo < V ′o and τ(V ′o) <
τ(Vo). By Equation (3), there is Vd such that ϕo(Vd, Vo) = γ and ϕo(Vd, V
′
o) 6= γ. Then, ϕo(Vd, V ′o) =
f(Vd, V
′
o). Suppose Vo is the valuation of the owner. Then, by strategy-proofness, we have Vo =
uo(γ) = uo(ϕo(Vd, Vo)) ≥ uo(ϕo(Vd, V ′o)) = f(Vd, V ′o). Now, suppose V ′o is the valuation of the owner.
Then, by strategy-proofness, we have V ′o = uo(γ) = uo(ϕo(Vd, Vo)) ≤ uo(ϕo(Vd, V ′o)) = f(Vd, V ′o).
Hence, V ′o ≤ f(Vd, V ′o) ≤ Vo contradicting Vo < V ′o . Therefore, τ is non-decreasing.
I τ is continuous.
Let Vo ∈ R+. We show that τ is right-continuous and left-continuous at Vo.
Step 1: τ is right-continuous at Vo.
Let {V no }∞n=1 be such that V no is non-increasing in n and V no n→∞−−−→ Vo. Let Vd ≡ τ(Vo). Since
for each n = 1, 2, ..., V no ≥ Vo and τ is non-decreasing, we have τ(V no ) ≥ τ(Vo) = Vd. Hence,
ud(ϕd(Vd, V
n
o )) = τ(V
n
o ) and ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)) = τ(Vo). Since ϕ is continuous, τ(V
n
o )
n→∞−−−→ τ(Vo).
Hence, τ is right-continuous at Vo.
Before proving τ is left-continuous at Vo, we show that ϕ satisfies another type of continuity.
Lemma 3. If ϕ is dispossessed envy-free, strategy-proof, continuous, and object continuous, then
for each Vd ∈ R+, each {V no }∞n=1 such that V no n→∞−−−→ Vo, and each n = 1, 2, ..., with ϕd(Vd, V no ) = γ,
we have ϕd(Vd, Vo) = γ.
6
6Note that this continuity property is based on a sequence of valuations of the owner (i.e., not valuations of the
dispossessed agent as in object continuity).
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Proof. Suppose there exist Vd ∈ R+ and {V no }∞n=1 such that V no n→∞−−−→ Vo, and for each n = 1, 2, ...,
ϕd(Vd, V
n
o ) = γ, but ϕd(Vd, Vo) 6= γ. Note that ud(ϕd(Vd, V no )) = Vd. For each n = 1, 2, ...,
τ(V no ) ≤ Vd and τ(Vo) > Vd. Since ϕ is continuous, Vd = ud(ϕd(Vd, V no )) n→∞−−−→ ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)). By
Lemma 2, ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)) = τ(Vo). Hence, τ(Vo) = Vd contradicting τ(Vo) > Vd.
Step 2: τ is left-continuous at Vo.
Assume that τ is not left-continuous at Vo. Let {V no }∞n=1 be such that V no is non-decreasing
and V no
n→∞−−−→ Vo and τ(V no ) does not converge to τ(Vo). Since V no is non-decreasing and τ is
non-decreasing, τ(V no ) is a non-decreasing sequence, bounded by τ(Vo). Hence, there exists V
∗ ≡
limn→∞ τ(V no ). By assumption (τ is not left-continuous at Vo), V ∗ 6= τ(Vo). Hence, V ∗ < τ(Vo). Let
Vd be such that V
∗ < Vd < τ(Vo). Since τ is non-decreasing, for each n = 1, 2, ..., τ(V no ) ≤ V ∗ < Vd
and, hence, ϕd(Vd, V
n
o ) = γ. By Lemma 3, ϕd(Vd, Vo) = γ contradicting Vd < τ(Vo).
I τ satisfies constant threshold.
Let τ(Vo) < Vo and V
′
o > Vo. Suppose τ(V
′
o) 6= τ(Vo). Since τ is non-decreasing, τ(V ′o) > τ(Vo).
Let Vd be such that τ(Vo) < Vd < min{Vo, τ(V ′o)}. Suppose Vo is the valuation of the owner. Then,
uo(ϕo(Vd, Vo)) = f(Vd, Vo). By Equation (2), f(Vd, Vo) ≤ Vd < Vo. The owner can report V ′o instead
and obtain uo(ϕo(Vd, V
′
o)) = uo(γ) = Vo. Then, V
′
o is a profitable manipulation for the owner at
(Vd, Vo) in violation of strategy-proofness. Hence, τ satisfies constant threshold.
We have shown that τ ∈ T . We know at this point that for each (Vd, Vo) with Vd ≥ τ(Vo),
ϕ(Vd, Vo) = (γ, f(Vd, Vo)). We now construct a function m ∈ M(τ) and show Equation (1a) in
three steps.
Step 1: For each Vo, V
′
o ∈ R+ and Vd ∈ Vd(τ) such that Vd ≥ τ(Vo) and Vd ≥ τ(V ′o), we have
f(Vd, Vo) = f(Vd, V
′
o).
Let Vo, V
′
o ∈ R+ and Vd ∈ Vd(τ) such that Vd ≥ τ(Vo) and Vd ≥ τ(V ′o). Then, by Equation (2),
ϕo(Vd, Vo) = f(Vd, Vo) and ϕo(Vd, V
′
o) = f(Vd, V
′
o). Since ϕ is strategy-proof, f(Vd, Vo) = f(Vd, V
′
o).
Step 2: Let m : Vd(τ) → R+ be defined as m(Vd) = f(Vd, Vo) for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ with
Vd ≥ τ(Vo). Note that by Equation (2), m(Vd) ≤ Vd for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ).
Step 3: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ with Vd ≥ τ(Vo), m(Vd) ∈ [l(Vd), u(Vd)].
Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ with Vd ≥ τ(Vo). By Step 2, we are done if Vd is of type 2© or 3©. Let Vd be of
type 1©. Then, there exists Vo such that τ(Vo) = Vd. Let V ′o > Vo be such that τ(V ′o) > τ(Vo). (See
Figure 2(a) and (b).) Then, ϕo(Vd, V
′
o) = γ. If ϕo(Vd, Vo) = m(Vd) < Vo, then V
′
o is a profitable
manipulation for the owner at (Vd, Vo) in violation of strategy-proofness. Hence, m(Vd) ≥ Vo.
Using the previous arguments, we have that m(Vd) ≥ V˜o for each V˜o with τ(V˜o) ≤ Vd.
Hence, m(Vd) ≥ supV˜o{V˜o|τ(V˜o) ≤ Vd}. Since τ is non-decreasing and continuous, m(Vd) ≥
maxV˜o{V˜o|τ(V˜o) = Vd}. Then, m(Vd) ≥ max{τ−1(Vd)}.
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Suppose m(Vd) 6= max{τ−1(Vd)}. Then, ϕo(Vd, Vo) = m(Vd) > max{τ−1(Vd)}. Let V ′′o be such
that max{τ−1(Vd)} < V ′′o < m(Vd). Then, ϕo(Vd, V ′′o ) = γ. Then, Vo is a profitable manipulation
for the owner at (Vd, V
′′
o ) in violation of strategy-proofness. Hence, m(Vd) = max{τ−1(Vd)}.
(⇐) We need to show that ϕτ,m is dispossessed envy-free, strategy-proof, continuous, and object
continuous.
I ϕτ,m is dispossessed envy-free.
Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+.
Case 1: Vd ≥ τ(Vo).
Then, we have ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, Vo)) = ud(γ) = Vd. Note that if Vd is of type 1©, m(Vd) = max{τ−1(Vd)}.
By constant threshold, max{τ−1(Vd)} ≤ Vd. If Vd is of type 2© or 3©, m(Vd) ≤ u(Vd) = Vd. Hence,
ud(ϕ
τ,m
o (Vd, Vo)) ≤ Vd = ud(ϕτ,md (Vd, Vo)).
Case 2: Vd < τ(Vo).
Then, we have ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, Vo)) = τ(Vo) > Vd = ud(γ) = ud(ϕ
τ,m
o (Vd, Vo)).
Therefore, the dispossessed agent never envies the owner.
I ϕτ,m is strategy-proof.
We show that the rule is strategy-proof for each agent.
Step 1: ϕτ,m is strategy-proof for the dispossessed agent.
Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+.
Case 1: Vd ≥ τ(Vo).
Then, ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, Vo)) = ud(γ) = Vd. Let V
′
d 6= Vd. If V ′d ≥ τ(Vo), then ud(ϕτ,md (V ′d, Vo)) = ud(γ) =
Vd. If V
′
d < τ(Vo), then ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (V
′
d, Vo)) = ud(τ(Vo)) = τ(Vo) ≤ Vd. So, there is no profitable
manipulation for the dispossessed agent.
Case 2: Vd < τ(Vo).
Then, ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, Vo)) = ud(τ(Vo)) = τ(Vo). Let V
′
d 6= Vd. If V ′d < τ(Vo), then ud(ϕτ,md (V ′d, Vo)) =
ud(τ(Vo)) = τ(Vo). If V
′
d ≥ τ(Vo), then ud(ϕτ,md (V ′d, Vo)) = ud(γ) = Vd < τ(Vo). So, there is no
profitable manipulation for the dispossessed agent.
Therefore, ϕτ,m is strategy-proof for the dispossessed agent.
Step 2: ϕτ,m is strategy-proof for the owner.
Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+.
Case 1: Vd ≥ τ(Vo).
At (Vd, Vo), the owner does not get the object and receives ϕo(Vd, Vo) = m(Vd). Let V
′
o 6= Vo.
The owner changes the allocation if and only if Vd < τ(V
′
o) and in that case it is profitable if and
only if Vo > m(Vd). So, assume Vd < τ(V
′
o). We show that Vo ≤ l(Vd). So, there is no profitable
manipulation for the owner.
Since τ(V ′o) > Vd ≥ τ(Vo) and τ is continuous and satisfies constant threshold, τ−1(Vd) 6= ∅ and
max{τ−1(Vd)} <∞. Then, Vd is of type 1© and l(Vd) = max{τ−1(Vd)} ≥ Vo.
Case 2: Vd < τ(Vo).
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Obviously, Vd can only be of type 1© or 3©. The owner gets the object at (Vd, Vo). The only possible
candidate for a profitable manipulation is V ′o < Vo such that τ(V ′o) ≤ Vd provided that Vo < m(Vd).
We show that Vo ≥ u(Vd). So, there is no profitable manipulation for the owner.
If Vd is of type 3©, then τ−1(Vd) = ∅. Since τ is continuous and τ(Vo) > Vd ≥ τ(V ′o), there is a
some V ′′o with τ(V ′′o ) = Vd contradicting τ−1(Vd) = ∅.
If Vd is of type 1©, then u(Vd) = max{τ−1(Vd)}. So, τ(u(Vd)) = Vd. Since τ(Vo) > Vd and τ is
non-decreasing, u(Vd) < Vo.
Therefore, ϕτ,m is strategy-proof for the owner.
Therefore, ϕτ,m is strategy-proof.
I ϕτ,m is continuous.
Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ and {V no }∞n=1 such that V no n→∞−−−→ Vo. Since τ is continuous, τ(V no ) n→∞−−−→ τ(Vo).
Case 1: There exists N such that for each n ≥ N , Vd ≥ τ(V no ).
Since τ(V no )
n→∞−−−→ τ(Vo), Vd ≥ τ(Vo). Therefore, for each n ≥ N , we have ud(ϕτ,md (Vd, V no )) =
ud(γ) = Vd = ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, Vo)).
Case 2: There exists N such that for each n ≥ N , Vd < τ(V no ).
Since τ(V no )
n→∞−−−→ τ(Vo), Vd ≤ τ(Vo). Then, either Vd < τ(Vo) in which case we have for each
n ≥ N , ud(ϕτ,md (Vd, V no )) = τ(V no )
n→∞−−−→ τ(Vo) = ud(ϕτ,md (Vd, Vo)) or Vd = τ(Vo) in which case we
have for each n ≥ N , ud(ϕτ,md (Vd, V no )) = τ(V no )
n→∞−−−→ τ(Vo) = Vd = ud(γ) = ud(ϕτ,md (Vd, Vo)).
Case 3: For each N , there exist n ≥ N with Vd ≥ τ(V no ) and n′ ≥ N with Vd < τ(V n
′
o ).
Let V i1o , V
i2
o , ... and V
j1
o , V
j2
o , ... be two infinite subsequences of V 1o , V
2
o , ... such that {i1, i2, ...} ∪
{j1, j2, ...} = {1, 2, ...}, Vd ≥ τ(V iko ) for each k = 1, 2, ..., and Vd < τ(V jko ) for each k = 1, 2, ....
Now, let Vo
k ≡ V iko and Vok ≡ V jko for each k = 1, 2, .... Note that Vo1, Vo2, ... and Vo1, Vo2, ...
complement one another (with respect to the original sequence V 1o , V
2
o , ...).
Since V no
n→∞−−−→ Vo, we have Von n→∞−−−→ Vo and Von n→∞−−−→ Vo. By the conti-
nuity of τ , τ(Vo
n
)
n→∞−−−→ τ(Vo) and τ(Von) n→∞−−−→ τ(Vo). By arguments similar to
Case 1, ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, Vo
n
))
n→∞−−−→ ud(ϕτ,md (Vd, Vo)) and by arguments similar to Case 2,
ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, Vo
n))
n→∞−−−→ ud(ϕτ,md (Vd, Vo)). Since the two subsequences Vo
1
, Vo
2
, ... and Vo
1, Vo
2, ...
complement one another with respect to the original sequence V 1o , V
2
o , ..., it follows that ϕ
τ,m is
continuous.
I ϕτ,m is object continuous.
Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ and {V nd }∞n=1 be such that V nd
n→∞−−−→ Vd. Assume that for each n = 1, 2, ...,
ϕτ,md (V
n
d , Vo) = γ. Then, for each n = 1, 2, ..., we have V
n
d ≥ τ(Vo). Hence, Vd ≥ τ(Vo) and
ϕτ,md (Vd, Vo) = γ. Therefore, ϕ
τ,m is object continuous.
Therefore, ϕτ,m is dispossessed envy-free, strategy-proof, continuous, and object continuous.
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Proposition 2. Let τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ). Then, ϕτ,m is pair strategy-proof if and only if for
each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) = 0 and there exists a constant c ∈ R+ such that for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ) = R+,
m(Vd) = c.
Proof.
(⇒) Let τ ∈ T , m ∈M(τ), and ϕτ,m be pair strategy-proof.
Step 1: There is a constant k ∈ R+ such that for each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) = k.
Suppose it is not the case. Then, there exist Vo and V
′
o such that τ(Vo) 6= τ(V ′o). Without
loss of generality, assume that Vo < V
′
o . Since τ is non-decreasing, τ(Vo) < τ(V
′
o). Since τ
is continuous, there exists V ′′o such that τ(Vo) < τ(V ′′o ) < τ(V ′o). Let Vd be such that Vd <
τ(V ′′o ). Then, ϕτ,m(Vd, V ′′o ) = (τ(V ′′o ), γ) and ϕτ,m(Vd, V ′o) = (τ(V ′o), γ). Then, uo(ϕ
τ,m
o (Vd, V
′′
o )) =
uo(ϕ
τ,m
o (Vd, V
′
o)) and ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, V
′′
o )) = τ(V
′′
o ) < τ(V
′
o) = ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, V
′
o)). Hence, (Vd, V
′
o) is a
profitable joint manipulation at (Vd, V
′′
o ), in violation of pair strategy-proofness.
Step 2: There is a constant c ∈ R+ such that for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) = c.
Suppose it is not the case. Then, there exist Vd, V
′
d ∈ Vd(τ) such that m(Vd) 6= m(V ′d). Let
Vo and V
′
o be such that Vd ≥ τ(Vo) and V ′d ≥ τ(V ′o). Without loss of generality, assume that
m(Vd) < m(V
′
d). Then, by Step 1, ϕ
τ,m(Vd, Vo) = (γ,m(Vd)) and ϕ
τ,m(V ′d, Vo) = (γ,m(V
′
d)). Then,
ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, Vo)) = ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, V
′
o)) and uo(ϕ
τ,m
o (Vd, V
′
o)) = m(V
′
d) > m(Vd) = uo(ϕ
τ,m
o (Vd, Vo)).
Hence, (Vd, V
′
o) is a profitable joint manipulation at (Vd, Vo), in violation of pair strategy-proofness.
Summarizing Steps 1 and 2,
ϕτ,m(Vd, Vo) =
{
(γ, c) if Vd ≥ k;
(k, γ) if Vd < k.
Step 3: k = 0.
Suppose it is not the case. Then, k > 0. Let (Vd, Vo) be such that Vd = k and Vo > c. Let
V ′d < Vd. Then, ϕ
τ,m(V ′d, Vo) = (k, γ) and ϕ
τ,m(Vd, Vo) = (γ, c). Then, ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (V
′
d, Vo)) = k = Vd =
ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, Vo)) and uo(ϕ
τ,m
o (V ′d, Vo)) = Vo > c = uo(ϕ
τ,m
o (Vd, Vo)). Hence, (V
′
d, Vo) is a profitable
joint manipulation at (Vd, Vo), in violation of pair strategy-proofness.
(⇐) For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, ϕτ=0,m=c(Vd, Vo) = (γ, c). Hence, there is no profitable joint manipu-
lation. Therefore, ϕτ=0,m=c is pair strategy-proof.
Proposition 3. Let τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ). Then, ϕτ,m is weakly pair strategy-proof.
Proof. Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+. Assume that the owner receives the object. Then, Vd < τ(Vo) and
ϕτ,m(Vd, Vo) = (τ(Vo), γ). The only possible manipulation that might make both of them better
off is (V ′d, V
′
o) such that ϕ
τ,m(V ′d, V
′
o) = (γ,m(V
′
d)). Then, τ(Vo) > Vd = ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (V
′
d, V
′
o)), which
means the dispossessed agent is worse off. Hence, there is no profitable joint manipulation that
makes both of them better off.
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Next, assume that the dispossessed agent receives the object. Then, Vd ≥ τ(Vo) and
ϕτ,m(Vd, Vo) = (γ,m(Vd)). The only possible manipulation that might make both of them better
off is (V ′d, V
′
o) such that ϕ
τ,m(V ′d, V
′
o) = (τ(V
′
o), γ). Suppose (V
′
d, V
′
o) is a profitable manipulation.
Then, τ(V ′o) > Vd ≥ τ(Vo). Hence, Vd is of type 1©, i.e., m(Vd) = max{τ−1(Vd)}. Since (V ′d, V ′o)
is profitable, Vo > m(Vd). Then, Vo > max{τ−1(Vd)}. Since τ is non-decreasing, τ(Vo) > Vd,
contradicting Vd ≥ τ(Vo). Hence, there is no profitable joint manipulation that makes both of them
better off. Therefore, ϕτ,m is weakly pair strategy-proof.
Proposition 4. No rule satisfies envy-freeness, strategy-proofness and government budget con-
straint.
Proof. By Proposition 1, if a rule ϕ is envy-free and strategy-proof, then there is a tie-breaking
function θ such that ϕ = ϕθ. Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ be such that Vd > Vo and Vd > Vg. Then,
ϕθo(Vd, Vo) = Vd > Vg. Hence, ϕ
θ does not satisfy government budget constraint.
Theorem 2. A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object
continuity, and government budget constraint if and only if ϕ = ϕτ,m where τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ)
are such that
• for each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) ≤ Vg and
• for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) ∈ [l(Vd), u(Vd)] with u(Vd) = min{Vd, Vg} if Vd is of type 2© or 3©.
Proof.
(⇒) By Theorem 1, we know that there exist a threshold function τ ∈ T and a compensation
function m ∈M(τ). Since ϕ satisfies government budget constraint, for each (Vd, Vo), if Vd < τ(Vo),
then τ(Vo) ≤ Vg (?), and if Vd ≥ τ(Vo), then m(Vd) ≤ Vg (??).
I For each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) ≤ Vg. (•)
If τ(Vo) = 0, then τ(Vo) ≤ Vg. If τ(Vo) 6= 0, then by taking Vd = 0 in (?), τ(Vo) ≤ Vg.
I For each Vd ∈ Vd(τ) that is of type 2© or 3©, m(Vd) ≤ min{Vd, Vg}.
Let Vd ∈ Vd(τ) be of type 2© or 3©. If Vd ≤ Vg, then by the definition of m, m(Vd) ≤ Vd =
min{Vd, Vg}. So, suppose Vd > Vg. By (•), for each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) ≤ Vg < Vd. Then, Vd is of
type 3©. Let Vo ∈ R+. By (??), m(Vd) ≤ Vg = min{Vd, Vg}.
Therefore, the threshold function τ and the compensation function m satisfy the conditions in
the statement of the theorem.
(⇐) Let τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ) satisfy the conditions in the statement of the theorem. We show
that ϕτ,m satisfies government budget constraint. (By Theorem 1, ϕτ,m satisfies the other properties
described in Theorem 2.)
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Suppose Vd < τ(Vo). Then, ϕ
τ,m(Vd, Vo) = (τ(Vo), γ). Since for each V
′
o ∈ R+, τ(V ′o) ≤ Vg, we
have ϕτ,md (Vd, Vo) ≤ Vg.
Suppose Vd ≥ τ(Vo). Then, ϕτ,m(Vd, Vo) = (γ,m(Vd)).
If Vd is of type 1©, then m(Vd) = max{τ−1(Vd)} ≤ Vg. To see this, suppose max{τ−1(Vd)} > Vg.
Since Vd is of type 1©, by constant threshold max{τ−1(Vd)} ≤ Vd. Then, Vg < max{τ−1(Vd)} ≤ Vd.
Since τ(Vo) ≤ Vg, we have τ(Vo) < Vd contradicting Vd ≥ τ(Vo).
If Vd is of type 2© or 3©, then m(Vd) ≤ min{Vd, Vg}. Hence, ϕτ,mo (Vd, Vo) ≤ Vg. Therefore, ϕτ,m
satisfies government budget constraint.
Proposition 5. Let τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ). Then, ϕτ,m satisfies dispossessed welfare lower bound.
Proof. Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+. We show ud(ϕτ,md (Vd, Vo)) ≥ Vd. If Vd ≥ τ(Vo), then ud(ϕτ,md (Vd, Vo)) =
ud(γ) = Vd. If Vd < τ(Vo), then ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, Vo)) = ud(τ(Vo)) > Vd. Therefore, ϕ
τ,m satisfies
dispossessed welfare lower bound.
Theorem 3. A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object
continuity, and owner welfare lower bound if and only if ϕ = ϕτ,m where τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ)
are such that
• for each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) ≥ min{Vo, Vg} and
• for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) ∈ [l(Vd), u(Vd)] with l(Vd) = min{Vd, Vg} if Vd is of type 2© or 3©.
Proof.
(⇒) By Theorem 1, we know that there exist τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ) such that ϕ = ϕτ,m.
I For each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) ≥ min{Vo, Vg}. (♦)
Suppose that there exists Vo such that τ(Vo) < min{Vo, Vg}. Let Vd be such that τ(Vo) < Vd <
min{Vo, Vg}. Then, ϕo(Vd, Vo) = m(Vd). By the definition of m, m(Vd) ≤ Vd. Hence, m(Vd) <
min{Vo, Vg} in violation of owner welfare lower bound.
I For each Vd ∈ Vd(τ) that is of type 2© or 3©, m(Vd) ≥ min{Vd, Vg}.
Let Vd ∈ Vd(τ) be of type 2© or 3©. Let Vo be such that Vd ≥ τ(Vo). Then, ϕτ,m(Vd, Vo) = (γ,m(Vd)).
Case 1: Vd is of type 2©.
Subcase 1.1: Vd ≥ Vg.
Suppose m(Vd) < Vg. Let V
′
o ∈ (m(Vd), Vg). Since Vd is of type 2©, Vd ≥ τ(V ′o). Then,
ϕτ,m(Vd, V
′
o) = (γ,m(Vd)). By owner welfare lower bound and V
′
o < Vg, m(Vd) ≥ V ′o contradicting
the choice of V ′o . Hence, m(Vd) ≥ Vg = min{Vd, Vg}.
Subcase 1.2: Vd < Vg.
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Suppose m(Vd) < Vd. Let ε > 0 be such that m(Vd) + ε ≤ Vd. Since Vd is of type 2© and τ
satisfies constant threshold, we have min(τ−1(Vd)) ≤ Vd. Let V ′o = max{min(τ−1(Vd)),m(Vd) + ε}.
Note that V ′o ≤ Vd. Since Vd is of type 2© and τ satisfies constant threshold, Vd = τ(V ′o). Then,
ϕτ,m(Vd, V
′
o) = (γ,m(Vd)). By owner welfare lower bound and V
′
o ≤ Vd < Vg, m(Vd) ≥ V ′o .
However, by the choice of V ′o , V ′o ≥ m(Vd) + ε > m(Vd) contradicting m(Vd) ≥ V ′o . Hence,
m(Vd) ≥ Vd = min{Vd, Vg}.
Case 2: Vd is of type 3©.
Subcase 2.1: Vd ≥ Vg.
Suppose m(Vd) < Vg. Let V
′
o ∈ (m(Vd), Vg). Let V ? ≡ maxvo τ(vo). (Note that V ? is well-
defined because Vd ∈ Vd(τ) is of type 3©.) Since Vd is of type 3©, Vd > V ? ≥ τ(V ′o). Then,
ϕτ,m(Vd, V
′
o) = (γ,m(Vd)). By owner welfare lower bound and V
′
o < Vg, m(Vd) ≥ V ′o contradicting
the choice of V ′o . Hence, m(Vd) ≥ Vg = min{Vd, Vg}.
Subcase 2.2: Vd < Vg.
Let Vo > Vd. Since Vd is of type 3©, τ(Vo) < Vd. Then, τ(Vo) < min{Vo, Vg} contradicting (♦).
Therefore, the threshold function τ and the compensation function m satisfy the conditions in
the statement of the theorem.
(⇐) Let τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ) satisfy the conditions in the statement of the theorem. We show
that ϕτ,m satisfies owner welfare lower bound. (By Theorem 1, ϕτ,m satisfies the other properties
described in Theorem 3.) Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+.
If ϕτ,mo (Vd, Vo) = γ, then immediately uo(ϕ
τ,m
o (Vd, Vo)) ≥ min{Vo, Vg}. If ϕτ,mo (Vd, Vo) 6= γ, then
Vd ≥ τ(Vo). By the definition of τ , τ(Vo) ≥ min{Vo, Vg}. Hence, Vd ≥ min{Vo, Vg}.
We now check that m(Vd) = ϕ
τ,m
o (Vd, Vo) ≥ min{Vo, Vg}.
If Vd is of type 1©, then m(Vd) = max{τ−1(Vd)}. Since τ is non-decreasing and Vd ≥ τ(Vo),
max{τ−1(Vd)} ≥ Vo. Hence, m(Vd) ≥ min{Vo, Vg}.
If Vd is of type 2© or 3©, m(Vd) ≥ min{Vd, Vg}. Since Vd ≥ min{Vo, Vg}, m(Vd) ≥ min{Vo, Vg}.
Therefore, ϕτ,m satisfies owner welfare lower bound.
Theorem 4. A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object
continuity, government budget constraint, and owner welfare lower bound if and only if ϕ = ϕτ,m
where τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ) are such that
• for each Vo ∈ R+, min{Vo, Vg} ≤ τ(Vo) ≤ Vg and (∗)
• for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) ∈ [l(Vd), u(Vd)] with l(Vd) = u(Vd) = Vg if Vd is of type 2©
or 3©. (∗∗)
Proof. Let τ ∈ T be such that for each Vo, min{Vg, Vo} ≤ τ(Vo) ≤ Vg. Let Vd ∈ Vd(τ) be of type
2© or 3©. We show that min{Vd, Vg} = Vg. Since for each Vo, min{Vg, Vo} ≤ τ(Vo) ≤ Vg, it follows
26
that for each V ′o > Vg, Vg = τ(V ′o). Hence, Vg = maxvo∈R+ τ(vo). Since Vd is of type 2© or 3©,
maxvo∈R+ τ(vo) ≤ Vd. Hence, Vg ≤ Vd. Therefore, min{Vd, Vg} = Vg. (4)
(⇒) By Theorems 2 and 3, we know that there exist τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ) such that ϕ = ϕτ,m and
for each Vo ∈ R+, min{Vo, Vg} ≤ τ(Vo) ≤ Vg (∗). It remains to show that for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ) of
type 2© or 3©, l(Vd) = u(Vd) = Vg. By (∗) and (4), for each Vd of type 2© or 3©, l(Vd) = u(Vd) =
min{Vd, Vg} = Vg. Therefore, the threshold function τ and the compensation function m satisfy
the conditions in the statement of the theorem.
(⇐) Let τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ) satisfy the conditions in the statement of the theorem. By (∗),
(∗∗) and (4), for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ) of type 2© or 3©, l(Vd) = u(Vd) = Vg = min{Vd, Vg}. Then, by
Theorems 2 and 3, ϕτ,m satisfies all properties described in Theorem 4.
Tightness of the characterizations:
For each rule in the following examples, we indicate the unique axiom in the statement of Theorem 4
that the rule does not satisfy. We also show that the following rules satisfy dispossessed welfare
lower bound and weak pair strategy-proofness. See Table 2 for a summary.
1. Dispossessed envy-freeness: The rule ϕG is defined as ϕG(Vd, Vo) = (γ, Vg) for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+.
Proof. Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ be such that Vd < Vg. Then, ud(ϕGd (Vd, Vo)) = Vd < Vg = ud(ϕGo (Vd, Vo))
which is a contradiction to dispossessed envy-freeness.
Since the allocation is independent of the reported valuations of the agents, ϕG is strategy-proof
and weakly pair strategy-proof. Since ϕG is constant, it is continuous and object continuous. Since
the owner always receives Vg, ϕ
G satisfies government budget constraint and owner welfare lower
bound. Since the dispossessed agent always gets the object, ϕG satisfies dispossessed welfare lower
bound.
2. Strategy-proofness: The rule ϕmin,Vg is defined as
ϕmin,Vg(Vd, Vo) =
{
(γ,min{Vo, Vg}) if Vd ≥ Vg;
(Vg, γ) if Vd < Vg,
for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+.
Proof. Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ be such that Vo < Vg ≤ Vd. Then, ϕmin,Vg(Vd, Vo) = (γ, Vo). Let V ′o be
such that Vg > V
′
o > Vo. Then, ϕ
min,Vg(Vd, V
′
o) = (γ, V
′
o). Hence, uo(ϕ
min,Vg
o (Vd, V
′
o)) = V
′
o > Vo =
uo(ϕ
min,Vg
o (Vd, Vo)). Then, V
′
o is a profitable manipulation for the owner at (Vd, Vo). Hence, ϕ
min,Vg
is not strategy-proof.
It is to easy to see that ϕmin,Vg is dispossessed envy-free. For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, if Vd ≥ Vg, the
dispossessed agent gets the object and the owner receives min{Vo, Vg} ≤ Vd. If Vd < Vg, the owner
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gets the object and the dispossessed agent receives Vg > Vd. It is easy but cumbersome to show
that ϕmin,Vg is continuous and object continuous.
Since the rule always assigns a compensation less than Vg, ϕ
min,Vg satisfies government budget
constraint. For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, if ϕmin,Vgo (Vd, Vo) 6= γ, then uo(ϕmin,Vgo (Vd, Vo)) = min{Vo, Vg}.
Hence, ϕmin,Vg satisfies owner welfare lower bound. For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, if ϕmin,Vgd (Vd, Vo) 6= γ,
then ud(ϕ
min,Vg
d (Vd, Vo)) = Vg and Vg > Vd. Hence, ϕ
min,Vg satisfies dispossessed welfare lower
bound. Finally, ϕmin,Vg is weakly pair strategy-proof. The proof is very similar to the one of
Proposition 3.
3. Continuity: The rule ϕ◦ is defined as
ϕ◦(Vd, Vo) =

(γ, Vg) if Vd ≥ τ(Vo) and Vd ≥ Vg;
(γ,
Vg
2 ) if Vd ≥ τ(Vo) and Vd < Vg;
(Vg, γ) if Vd < τ(Vo) and Vo >
Vg
2 ;
(
Vg
2 , γ) if Vd < τ(Vo) and Vo ≤ Vg2 ,
where τ(Vo) =
{
Vg
2 if Vo ≤ Vg2 ;
Vg if Vo >
Vg
2 ,
for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+.
Proof. Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ be such that Vo = Vg2 < Vd < Vg. Let {V no }∞n=1 be such that V no > Vg2
and V no
n→∞−−−→ Vg2 . Then, for each n = 1, 2, ..., ud(ϕ◦d(Vd, V no )) = Vg but ud(ϕ◦d(Vd, Vo)) = Vd < Vg.
Hence, ϕ◦ is not continuous.
It is easy but cumbersome to show (case by case) that ϕ◦ is dispossessed envy-free, strategy-
proof, and object continuous. For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ and i ∈ {d, o}, if ϕ◦i (Vd, Vo) 6= γ, then
ϕ◦i (Vd, Vo) ≤ Vg. Hence, ϕ◦ satisfies government budget constraint. Since for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+,
uo(ϕ
◦
o(Vd, Vo)) ≥ min{Vo, Vg}, ϕ◦ satisfies owner welfare lower bound. Since the dispossessed agent
gets the object or receives a compensation greater than his valuation, ϕ◦ satisfies dispossessed
welfare lower bound. Finally, ϕ◦ is weakly pair strategy-proof. The proof is very similar to the one
of Proposition 3.
4. Object continuity: Let τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ). The rule ϕ> is defined as
ϕ>(Vd, Vo) =
{
(γ,m(Vd)) if Vd > τ(Vo);
(τ(Vo), γ) if Vd ≤ τ(Vo),
for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+.
Proof. Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ be such that Vd = τ(Vo). Let {V nd }∞n=1 such that V nd ≡ τ(Vo) + 1n . Then,
V nd
n→∞−−−→ τ(Vo) and for each n = 1, 2, ..., ϕ>d (V nd , Vo) = γ, but ϕ>d (Vd, Vo) 6= γ. Hence, ϕ> is not
object continuous.
ϕ> satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, government budget con-
straint, owner welfare lower bound, and weak pair strategy-proofness. The proofs are very similar
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to the ones of Theorems 1, 2, 3, and Propositions 3. Since the dispossessed agent gets the ob-
ject or receives a compensation greater than his valuation, ϕ> satisfies dispossessed welfare lower
bound.
5. Government budget constraint: The rule ϕk>Vg where k > Vg is defined as ϕ
k>Vg = ϕτ,m such
that for each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) = k and for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) = Vd.
Proof. Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ and Vd < k. Then, ϕk>Vgd (Vd, Vo) 6= γ. Then, ϕk>Vgd (Vd, Vo) = k > Vg.
Hence, ϕk>Vg does not satisfy government budget constraint.
Since ϕk>Vg is a member of the τ -m family, by Theorem 1, Propositions 3 and 5, ϕk>Vg satis-
fies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object continuity, dispossessed welfare
lower bound and weak pair strategy-proofness. For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, if ϕk>Vgo (Vd, Vo) 6= γ, then
Vd ≥ k and since k > Vg, uo(ϕk>Vgo (Vd, Vo)) = Vd ≥ min{Vo, Vg}. Hence, ϕk>Vg satisfies owner
welfare lower bound.
6. Owner welfare lower bound: The rule ϕτ=m=0 is defined as ϕτ=m=0 = ϕτ,m where for each
Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) = 0 and each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) = 0.
Proof. Let Vd ≥ 0 and Vo > 0. Then, ϕτ=m=0(Vd, Vo) = (γ, 0) and uo(ϕτ=m=0o (Vd, Vo)) = 0 <
min{Vo, Vg} in violation of owner welfare lower bound.
Since ϕτ=m=0 is a member of the τ -m family, by Theorem 1, Propositions 3 and 5, ϕτ=m=0
satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object continuity, dispossessed
welfare lower bound, and weak pair strategy-proofness. Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+. Then, for i ∈ {d, o}
with ϕτ=m=0i (Vd, Vo) 6= γ, ϕτ=m=0i (Vd, Vo) = 0 ≤ Vg. Hence, ϕτ=m=0 satisfies government budget
constraint.
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